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ANALYSIS
JUSTIFYING SENTENCING DISCOUNTS
FOR FOREIGNERS
Simon N. M. Young*
Should foreign offenders be entitled to a discount on sentence for the hardships they
will experience in a Hong Kong jail? There have been conflicting decisions from the
Court of Appeal on this issue. One approach is to say that the offender waives any
right to complain about such hardships which are, after all, foreseeable. Another
approach is to say that the hardships are too real for the law to ignore and must be
considered (with any other relevant factors) to ensure that the punishment is
proportional to the crime. The author argues, from both a legal and a philosophical
perspective, that the second approach should be followed.
Introduction
In recent months, the issue of whether foreign offenders are entitled to a
discount on sentence for the exceptional hardship they will face in a Hong
Kong jail has received a significant amount of public attention.' This is a
little surprising given that, prior to 2001, the issue had been considered in no
less than twelve Court of Appeal judgments dating back to 1980.2 Despite
the extensive judicial consideration of the issue, there is a lack of principled
analysis as to whether hardship in prison due to one's foreignness is a relevant
sentencing factor, and if it is, how it should affect the determination of
sentence.3 Indeed, the public criticism of recent cases signals a general dissat-
isfaction with the manner in which the judiciary has approached the issue.'
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong.
See generally, P. Tse, "Foreigners in their own land", HKiMail, 14 Sept 2001; A. Eu, "Prisoner transfers
better than term discounts", South China Morning Post, 1 Oct 2001, p 10; "Confusion in court", South
China Morning Post, 2 Oct 2001, p 11; C. Buddle, "Courts split on 'foreign' matter", South China
Morning Post, 5 Oct 2001, p 15; D. Cox, "Foreign prisoners feel so isolated", South China Morning
Post, 6 Oct 2001, p 13; R. Shamdasani, "'Nobody out there cares about us"', South China Morning
Post, 7 Nov 2001, p 16; D. Wong, "Special jail treatment sends wrong message", South China Morning
Post, 10 Nov 2001, p 17.
2 See R v Kumar, unrep., Cr App No 179 of 1980 (Court of Appeal); R v Ohmert, unrep., Cr App No
213 of 1985 (Court of Appeal); The Queen v Shipra [1988] 2 HKLR 493; The Queen v Okoye, [1991]
95 HKCU 1; AG v Rojas [1994] 2 HKCLR 69 (hereafter referred to as Rojas); R v Nwafor, unrep., Cr
App No 89 of 1993 (Court of Appeal); R v Oweh, unrep., Cr App No 208 of 1994 (Court of Appeal);
Rv Infante et al. [1996] HKLY 328; The Queen v Tekendra [1997] 517 HKCU 1; Rv Edgar, unrep., Cr
App No 22 of 1997 (Court of Appeal); Secretary for justice v Sugiyana, unrep., App for Rev No 4 of
1996 (Court of Appeal); HKSAR v Axel-Supardi [2000] HKEC 653.
3 However, the reasoning in HKSAR v Chau Chun Yee, unrep., Criminal Case No 264 of 2001 (Court
of First Instance, 24 Sept 2001) is an exception.
4 See n 1 above.
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This article reviews briefly the recent Court of Appeal cases and then
examines the conflicting moral principles that underlie the tension in the
case law. It will be argued that on the basis of the proportionality principle,
consequential hardships to all offenders, not only foreign ones, should be
taken into account in fashioning a just and appropriate sentence. Finally, the
factors affecting the weight to be given to consequential hardships in a par-
ticular case will be considered.
Conflicting Decisions from the Court of Appeal
The recent controversy over discounts on sentences for foreigners appears to
have been ignited by the Court of Appeal's decision in HKSAR v Rohrer,'
handed down on 21 August 2001. The decision gave rise to a flurry of lower
court decisions that took seemingly conflicting positions on the issue.6 Rohrer
was a German-speaking Swiss national who, using false travel documents,
had come to Hong Kong from Thailand to cash 61 counterfeit travellers'
cheques. He was sentenced to an imprisonment term of four years and four
months. The court held that Rohrer was entitled to a reduction in sentence
of three months because imprisonment would be a harsher regime for a for-
eigner who "might find himself isolated linguistically and culturally, having
to face an unfamiliar diet, and deprived of the opportunity of visits from his
family and friends."'
Rohrer appeared to recognise that the impact of imprisonment on a for-
eigner was a mitigating factor that could give rise to a specific reduction in
sentence. This seemed to go beyond what the court had previously held in
Attorney General v Rojas, and other authorities, that no specific discount should
be given and "while it is a factor to be taken into consideration, it is not one
which would affect sentence to any substantial degree."'
Less than two months later, the Court of Appeal was asked to revisit the
issue in two cases heard together, Secretary for Justice v Tse Ki Wu and Secre-
tary for Justice v Ng Kit and Chan Tat Wah.' In these cases, Rohrer was applied
to reduce the sentence of three mainland Chinese offenders convicted of
burglary and immigration offences. In an obvious effort to confine the hold-
ing of Rohrer, the court found that "a specific and substantial discount of
1 [2001] 3 HKLRD 175.
6 See generally "Robbers' jail terms cut for being foreign", HKiMail, 31 Aug 2001; "Mainland trio are
foreigners, says judge", HKiMail, 17 Sept 2001; "Judge rejects leniency for 'foreigner"', South China
Morning Post, 19 Sept 2001; "Hard line taken on mainland 'foreigners"', South China Morning Post, 25
Sept 2001; "Jail term appeal over bland food dismissed", South China Morning Post, 26 Sept 2001;
"Judges reject foreigners' pleas for reduced terms", South China Morning Post, 4 Oct 2001; "11 denied
sentence cut on 'foreignness' grounds", South China Morning Post, 25 Oct 2001.
Rohrer (n 5 above), para 14.
8 Rojas (n 2 above), p 73.
9 [2001] HKEC 1331 (hereafter referred to as Tse Ki Wu).
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3 months was given by reason of the particular circumstances of [that] case",
which did not establish any new principle."o In relation to foreigners in general,
the court held that the hardship arising from being "foreign" in a Hong Kong
jail "is only an aspect of the overall circumstances to be considered when a
court determines the appropriate sentence to be imposed ... and it is a factor
for which, depending on the circumstances of the case, little or no weight at
all should be given.""
The court went on to observe that the previous authorities did not find
"justification for a reduction of sentence simply by reason of the foreigner
having come to Hong Kong and committed an offence, who should take the
consequences as he finds them, including any hardship he might experience in a
foreign prison if he were caught and convicted"." In relation to mainland
Chinese nationals, the court held that, as Hong Kong is part of China, they
should not be considered "foreigners", and that:
"[als a matter of general rule, a person is not qualified to claim any dis-
count by being imprisoned in a part of his own country even [if] it is far
away from his home. The fact that his family finds it difficult to visit him
because of the distance involved is the defendant's own making.""
The holding is difficult to reconcile with that in Rohrer, as it could easily
be said that Rohrer should also have "taken the consequences as he found
them" and that his hardship "was his own making". The court fails to explain
what was special about Rohrer's circumstances that justified a specific dis-
count of three months. It is not surprising that the decision was criticised as
failing to clarify the confusion surrounding this issue.I
It now appears that the Court of Appeal has effectively overruled Rohrer
in HKSAR v Hong Chan-Chi, handed down on 13 Dec 2001.'" Hong Chan-
Chi involved a very serious offence of trafficking 3kg of cocaine from Peru to
Hong Kong. The offender, originally from Taiwan, pled guilty and was sen-
tenced to 17 years' imprisonment after the sentencing judge discounted the
sentence by one year on grounds of Hong's foreignness. In Hong's appeal for a
further sentence reduction, the Court of Appeal held that the sentencing
judge erred in giving the one year discount, as the discount was based on a
factor that "carried no weight at all."' Citing its earlier decision in Rojas, the
10 Ibid, para 19.
" Ibid.
12 Ibid. Emphasis added.
13 Ibid. Emphasis added.
14 "Reducing confusion", South China Morning Post, 6 Nov 2001, p 17.
15 HKSAR v Hong Chang-Chi, unrep., Criminal Appeal No 187 of 2001 (Court of Appeal, 13 Dec
2001).
16 Ibid, paras 17 and 26.
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court found that it was "difficult to see how [the court in Rohrer] could have
come to the conclusion it reached", and that "the decision to give a specific
discount for the 'foreigner' element in Rohrer was contrary to well-established
practice and, as such, was given per incuriam."17 The court noted that since
the appellant was ineligible under the Transfer of Sentence Persons Ordi-
nance (Cap 513) for transfer to Taiwan to serve his sentence, he was to be
treated on exactly the same basis as someone from mainland China. In an
obvious effort to try to settle the issue once and for all, the court stated that:
"... it should be made clear to non-residents of Hong Kong, whether from
the Mainland (or Taiwan) or from far-flung jurisdictions, that if they come
here in order to break the law, they will be treated no differently, and
certainly no more leniently, than other criminals who are normally resi-
dent here."'
Consequential Hardships as a General Sentencing Problem
To properly understand the underlying tension in these recent Court of Ap-
peal decisions, it must first be recognised that the issue is not one confined to
foreignness or foreigners. Rather, the issue is part of a more general problem
of how the law of sentencing should respond to the offender's personal char-
acteristics or circumstances that bear on the degree of hardship felt from the
sentence. It is almost inevitable that a sentence of imprisonment will cause
additional hardship to offenders over and above the immediate loss of liberty.
If one goes to jail for committing a crime, one stands to lose one's employment,
professional qualifications, and social status in the community. As well, the
conditions of imprisonment may be particularly harsh, not only for the
foreigner, but also for the pregnant, the aged, the seriously ill, police infor-
mants and sexual offenders. These hardships can be described as consequential
hardships, as they are consequent upon the sentence.
Consequential hardships, however, should be distinguished from those
hardships that are part of the sentence itself. These hardships, which can be
described as sentence hardships, are those that come within the contempla-
tion or purpose of the chosen form of sentence. For example, one of the
generally accepted purposes of imprisonment is to deprive the offender of
liberty by separating him or her from law-abiding members of the community.
Thus, hardships that are necessarily incidental to imprisonment, such as not
being able to watch one's favourite cable television programme or to have the
companionship of one's pet, are included within the sentence. It is because
society reasonably expects these hardships and discomforts to come within
17 Ibid, paras 15-16.
18 Ibid, para 21.
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the sentence that no special regard is given to them. This is different from
consequential hardships, which arise precisely because of the unique personal
circumstances of the offender and lie outside the contemplated effects of the
sentence.
By seeing the foreignness issue as a problem about consequential hardships,
it shifts the point of inquiry from "how foreign is this offender" to "how hard
will this sentence impact on this offender given his or her foreign background".
Consequently, the approach of many courts, including the court in Tse Ki Wu
and Hong Chang-Chi, to draw a line between those who are "foreign" and
those who are not is somewhat misguided. How different an offender is from
the ethnic make-up of Hong Kong in general and the Hong Kong prison
population in particular will not necessarily reveal how imprisonment will in
fact impact on the offender. There must be other evidence to this point.
Conflict Between Principles of Waiver and Proportionality
The tension between Rohrer and the two subsequent cases, Tse Ki Wu and
Hong Chang-Chi, reflects a broader conflict of basic moral principles in
sentencing. This conflict can be seen in relation to other forms of consequen-
tial hardships as well. The fundamental question giving rise to the conflict is
whether the sentence, which would otherwise be appropriate, should be miti-
gated in view of the consequential hardships that the particular offender will
experience as a result of his or her personal circumstances.
Those who have answered this question in the negative have relied on a
kind of "waiver" justification. This waiver principle is articulated as follows:
"an offender waives any right to complain about any consequential hardships
he or she foresees or ought reasonably to have foreseen at the time of the
offence." Echoes of this waiver principle are found in the court's decision in
Tse Ki Wu. The principle is framed objectively, as well as subjectively, since
most offenders give little thought to consequences, believing that they will
"get away" with the crime. Another reason for the objective standard is that
it will rarely be easy for a court to determine at the sentencing hearing the
genuine foresight of the offender at the time of the offence.
However, there are a number of difficulties with the waiver principle, irre-
spective of the appeal it may have in the context of sentencing foreign
offenders. First, the harshness of the principle, when taken to its logical
conclusion, simply does not reflect sentencing reality. Courts do not nor-
mally say to the aged,19 the pregnant,"o and the sick,"1 "well, you should have
19 See R v Chan Tak-sang et al. [19871 HKLR 1203 at 1207.
20 See HKSAR v Wu Fei-wan, unrep., Mag App No 985 of 1997, (Court of First Instance); R v Lee Yuk-
Ling et al., unrep., Mag App No 786 of 1992, (Supreme Court of Hong Kong, Litton JA).
21 See R v Chan Kui-sheung [1996] 3 HKC 279; R. v Leatherbarrow (1992) 13 Cr App R(S) 632.
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thought about your situation when you committed the offence. Now it is too
late." Indeed, Hong Kong courts have recognised that where a police officer
stands to lose his or her job and pension upon conviction, "losses and hard-
ships of this kind suffered by an offender over and above the sentence imposed
by the court may be taken into account as mitigating factors."22 It might be
said that the harshness is mitigated by the opportunity to show that one did
not reasonably foresee the consequences when the offence was committed.
But in reality, it will be exceptionally difficult to convince a judge of this lack
of objective foresight, especially if one is alleging that the consequence is
serious enough to take into mitigation on sentence.
A second and more significant problem with the waiver principle is that it
is in conflict with the principle of proportionality, which is recognised by
some as a fundamental principle of sentencing.23 The proportionality prin-
ciple requires that the punishment be proportional to the seriousness of the
offence and moral blameworthiness of the offender. Rather than ignore con-
sequential hardships, this principle requires such hardships to be considered
as part of the punishment in ensuring overall proportionality.
The proportionality principle is intimately connected with retributive or
desert-based notions of punishment and can be traced as far back, if not farther,
to the writings of the 18th century philosopher, Immanuel Kant:
"what kind and what amount of punishment is it that public justice makes
its principle and measure? None other than the principle of equality (in
the position of the needle on the scale of justice), to incline no more to
one side than to the other. Accordingly, whatever undeserved evil you
inflict upon another within the people, that you inflict upon yourself ...
[O]nly the law of retribution (ius talionis) - it being understood, of course,
that this is applied by a court (not by your private judgment) - can specify
definitely the quality and the quantity of punishment ... "24
In Regina v M.(C.A.), the Supreme Court of Canada recognised retribu-
tion as a legitimate principle of sentencing." The court described the link
between retribution and proportionality in these terms:
22 See AG v Poon Ping-kwok et al. [1992] 2 HKCLR 231 at 233, applied in HKSAR v Leung Chun Choi
[2000] HKEC 618, where the court expressly rejected the view that there should be no credit given
because the offender had "brought the matters upon himself'.
23 Section 718.1 of Canada's Criminal Code, RSC 1985, Ch C-46 provides under the heading "Funda-
mental Principle" that a "sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree
of responsibility of the offender".
24 1. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans M. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),
p 141.
25 [1996] 1 SCR 500.
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"Retribution in a criminal context ... represents an objective, reasoned
and measured determination of an appropriate punishment which properly re-
flects the moral culpability of the offender, having regard to the intentional
risk-taking of the offender, the consequential harm caused by the offender, and
the normative character of the offender's conduct. Furthermore, unlike
vengeance, retribution incorporates a principle of restraint; retribution
requires the imposition of a just and appropriate punishment, and nothing
more." 26
The reason for the conflict between the waiver principle and the propor-
tionality principle lies in the assertion that consequential hardship due to
one's personal circumstances constitutes part of the punishment in addition
to the sentence. In other words, proportionality requires that both the formal
sentence and the consequential hardships flowing from the application of the
sentence be counted together as the overall punishment. The hardships are
real enough that the law cannot ignore them.
One possible criticism of this assertion is that the sentence will necessarily
vary according to the personal circumstances of offenders. This is true, but
can it be justified? One aspect of the proportionality principle aims to reflect
the harm arising from the offence onto the offender in the form of punishment.
In assessing that harm, courts will normally look to the actual harm done and
the impact on the victim in the particular case. So it is sometimes said that
"the offender must take the victim as she finds him."27 Given this
contextualised assessment of offence gravity, it would seem to follow, under
the principle of proportionality, that in assessing the impact of punishment
on the offender, regard should also be had to his or her particular circumstances.
As Kant would say, what underlies proportionality is formal "equality", so
what is done on one side of the balance should also be done on the other.
By including consequential hardship in the definition of punishment, the
proportionality principle requires that such hardship be considered when fash-
ioning the appropriate sentence. This, however, is in sharp conflict with the
waiver principle, which disregards such hardship. Nevertheless, the general
approbation of the proportionality principle signals great doubt with the cor-
rectness of the waiver approach.
Can the Diminished Importance of the Factor be Justified?
It is clear that the principle of proportionality underlies the decision in Rohrer
and in the other pronouncements from the court recognising that consequential
26 Ibid, para 80. Emphasis added.
27 See R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411; R v Creighton [1993] 3 SCR 3 at para 91-6; R v Nette [2001] SCC
78 at para 79.
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hardship of foreigners can be properly considered as a sentencing factor. However,
there still remains a tension or paradox in the case law, and this is clearly evident
in the court's decision in Hong Chang-Chi. On the one hand, the court is prepared
to recognise the factor as legitimate (ie "a circumstance to be taken into
consideration"). Yet on the other hand the court deprives the factor of any sub-
stance by categorically holding that it should be given little if any weight in
determining sentence." The question then is whether there can be any justifica-
tion for diminishing the importance of the factor.
Serious Offences
The tension can partially be resolved by considering the application of the
proportionality principle in a practical context. The court's prescription to
give the factor little if any weight is supported in respect of serious cases in-
volving substantial terms of imprisonment. This is true for two reasons.
First, when dealing with serious offences, the degree of consequential hard-
ship for foreigners (unfamiliar diet, cultural and language isolation, deprived
opportunity of visits from family and friends) from an objective perspective
can generally only constitute a very minor portion of the deserved punishment.
In these cases, it is the harshness of the sentence itself (ie prolonged loss of
liberty) that will do most of the work in ensuring that the gravity of the
offence and moral blameworthiness are properly reflected on the offender. If
undue weight is given to the consequential hardship by a reduction in the
sentence, there is a real prospect that the overall punishment will be
disproportionate.
Second, a sentencing judge should not ordinarily reduce a term of impris-
onment unless the reduction can in fact address or alleviate the consequential
hardship in question. In other words, there should be a rational connection
between the nature of the consequential hardship and the judge's power to
alleviate that hardship. When dealing with serious offences for which the
offender stands to serve a considerable term of imprisonment (eg more than
three years), the judge has very few sentencing options other than to lengthen
or shorten the custodial time. Indeed, if sentencing judges had the power to
order transfer of prisoners to serve their sentences in their home country or to
mandate by injunction that prison officials address the dietary, cultural and
language alienation of the foreign prisoner, then the recent controversy may
never have arisen. It is submitted that the most sensible way to understand
the outcome in Hong Chang-Chi, which involved a very serious trafficking
offence, is on the basis of these two reasons.
Given the limited sentencing powers in serious cases, there is a real issue
of whether reducing the term of imprisonment can in fact alleviate the types
28 Hong Chang-Chi (n 15 above), para 14.
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of hardship complained of by foreign prisoners. For example, reducing Rohrer's
term by three months did not at all alleviate the dietary, social, cultural and
language alienation he will experience during the remaining portion of his
term. Of course, he will not have to endure these hardships for as long as he
would otherwise have had to, but the reduction in term still did not address
the essence of his complaints. The only power of the sentencing judge that
could alleviate Rohrer's hardship is the power to order a non-custodial
sentence. But given the seriousness of his offence, such an option was incon-
ceivable as it would have breached the proportionality principle.
In this respect, the hardships of foreign offenders are different from conse-
quential hardships that can in fact be addressed by a reduction in custodial
duration. For example, shortening a jail term may allow an older or ill of-
fender to avoid illness or further complications and possibly death while in
prison. Also, if the prison system had a rule that discriminated against for-
eigners by disallowing them access to an early release programme available
only to local inmates, then this is a hardship for which compensation can be
made in the form of a reduced term of imprisonment.29
Less Serious Offences
While these considerations may justify giving the factor minimal weight for
serious offences, the same is not necessarily true in regard to less serious
offences, which tend to involve a lesser degree of societal harm. In applying
the proportionality principle to less serious offences, the consequential hard-
ship may be sufficiently punitive to merit careful consideration in deciding
the formal sentence so as to ensure overall proportionality. For example, if an
offender stands to lose his job if he is imprisoned for more than a month, this
significant added hardship should be carefully considered by the sentencing
judge in deciding whether to impose a custodial term and, if imposed, whether
to keep it under one month.
Furthermore, in the realm of less serious crimes, the court has many more
sentencing options to tailor the punishment to the particular circumstances
of the offender. If there is evidence to find that the offender will experience
additional hardship, over and above those normally associated with
imprisonment, this factor becomes an important consideration in deciding
whether to order some alternative non-custodial form of sentence (eg
discharge, fine, community service order, probation, or suspended sentence).
29 There is some suggestion that a problem similar to this presently occurs in Hong Kong. See "Nobody
out there cares about us" (n 1 above).
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Maintaining a Principled Approach to the Issue
Returning to the issue of the Court of Appeal and sentencing discounts for
foreigners, it has been argued that any denial of a discount on the grounds of
"waiver" is unprincipled and should not be followed. The proportionality prin-
ciple requires that consequential hardships, if proven, should be taken into
consideration in deciding the formal sentence. In its consideration, the court
is attempting to ensure that the overall punishment (consequential hardships
plus formal sentence) is not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offence
and the moral blameworthiness of the offender.
It follows that the Court of Appeal's admonition to give the factor little or
no weight should not be taken as applying categorically to all cases. While
the admonition may generally be valid for serious cases, where the conse-
quential hardship pales in comparison to the societal harm involved, it does
not hold true for less serious offences, where the question of whether to order
custody or not is a real one.
It also follows from the proportionality principle that any absolute rule
that Chinese nationals, whether from the mainland or Taiwan, will never
suffer consequential hardships due to their cultural and ethnic backgrounds is
flawed. Such stereotyping should be avoided. Each case must be decided on
the evidence before the court, and there is sufficient cultural diversity in the
mainland and Taiwan to ground a plausible argument for recognition in cer-
tain cases.30
Conclusion
As mentioned, one of the problems underlying the controversy of sentenc-
ing discounts for foreigners is the court's lack of sentencing options to address
or alleviate consequential hardships. This practical constraint raises a more
general issue concerning sentencing law reform and the extent to which
the law should provide more expansive sentencing powers (especially
in serious cases) to enable tailor made sentences that can avoid consequen-
tial hardships. For example, a regime of self-imposed house arrest with
electronic monitoring, much like the Canadian conditional sentencing
regime, 3 is an alternative that allows for greater flexibility and creativity
in fashioning just and appropriate sentences. These sentences allow the
offender to serve a sentence of imprisonment in the community but under
30 See generally on ethnic diversity in China, Harrell, Stevan, ed, Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic
Frontiers (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995).
31 On the conditional sentencing regime in Canada, see generally, ss 742, 742.1-742.7 of the Criminal
Code (n 19 above) and R v Proulx [2000] 1 SCR 61.
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strict conditions and with immediate incarceration if found in breach of
the conditions. Comprehensive reform and rationalisation of Hong Kong's
sentencing laws are long overdue.32
The position taken in this article will undoubtedly attract criticism be-
cause it supports unequal treatment between foreign and local offenders.
However, this criticism is misplaced. Under the proportionality principle,
equality is achieved by providing all offenders with the same opportunity to
have their unique consequential hardships recognised to ensure that the overall
punishment is no more than what is deserved.
32 See "Sentencing system full of contradiction", South China Morning Post, 12 Nov 2001, p 14.
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